“The limits of my language
mean the limits of my world.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 1922 (5.6)

“To say what is”
But what, exactly, is ‘what is’?
“To say what is.” – But what, exactly, is what is?
This week SPIEGEL put the AfD’s candidate for the office of Minister-President of Saxony-Anhalt on its cover. Since then, criticism has been raining down on the editorial team, from right to left, from politicians and from other media. The newsmagazine is being criticized with rare unanimity.
Dirk Kurbjuweit of SPIEGEL justifies the editorial decision with the founder’s mandate: “Sagen, was ist” – translated by SPIEGEL itself as “Tell it like it is”, but more accurately rendered as “To say what is.” Invoking the same phrase, PIONEER’s Gabor Steingart senses that SPIEGEL is “on its way to becoming a left-wing Fox News.” He is no longer saying, he claims, what is, but practicing opinion journalism instead.
Is Is Not Is
But what, exactly, is that – what is? Or, asked with Aristotle: “τί τὸ ὄν (tí tò ón) – what is being?” – Contrary to the assumption, and the claim, made by both SPIEGEL and PIONEER, that one can simply say what is, Aristotle already explained: “Being is said in many ways” – τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς (to on legetai pollachōs). He develops a theory of categories that order our speech about being: quantity, quality, position, relation, and so on.
Simply put: the word is means something different each time, depending on whether I say: It is hot. Or: She is more intelligent than he is. Or: Friedrich Merz is Chancellor. Or even: Friedrich Merz is a good Chancellor.
Aristotle identified around ten categories in which being can be predicated. Much of what something or someone is, is changeable. The apple is first unripe, then ripe. It is first on the tree, then on the ground. It is mine or yours. – Yet there is something that the apple itself is, its ousia, as Aristotle calls it, its substance or essence, as the Latin translated it, or even the hypokeimenon, the underlying, from which the modern subject emerged.
If we want to say what is, we are searching for that (unchanging, true) essence of things. The core, the underlying. That is the claim of SPIEGEL, and the accusation levelled at PIONEER. But even the ancient Greeks already sensed they were onto a paradox here. Plutarch tells of the “Ship of Theseus”, whose planks were, one by one, all replaced. Some claimed the ship had remained the same throughout; others, that it was no longer the same. How, then, is one still to say what is?
Language as the “House of Being”
We are cutting radically short here (and impermissibly so): philosophy arrived at the insight that the essence of a thing is not an inherent property, but a linguistic attribution.
“Language is the house of Being. In this home, man dwells” (Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, 1946)
Because we dwell in it, we cannot get beyond language by means of language. The problem with saying what is does not lie in the is. It lies in the saying.
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus 5.6)
That is why the world looks different in different languages (Guy Deutscher). Reality does not exist in pure form.
Language itself has no fixed point, but consists of mutual references (Saussure). At the latest since language models started formulating all manner of impressive sentences without ever having seen the world, this much is clear. But it also means that we can only make statements about whether something is true or is false within a (linguistic) reference system.
This insight does not open the door to absolute relativism: for once we have committed to a reference system, true and false statements are entirely possible within it. Whoever accepts the reference system of medicine must accept that measles vaccines save lives. Whoever accepts the reference system of physics (and most of us rely on the brakes in our car) must accept that global warming is owed to the CO2 emissions of the recent past. – One can, of course, deny both; but then one finds oneself in a (performative) self-contradiction and can no longer be taken seriously, as Habermas and Apel pointed out.
To Say What Is?
SPIEGEL now manages the feat of entangling itself in a contradiction while also uttering a tautology:
“The AfD is here, unfortunately it is strong and therefore relevant, which is why it is the subject of our enlightening coverage, in every form.” (emphasis mine)
What it is really saying is: “The AfD is spoken about, unfortunately it is spoken about a great deal, which is why we speak about it.”
“The AfD is spoken about, therefore we speak about it.” – That is the obvious part, the tautology: a = a. And: “Unfortunately it is spoken about a great deal, therefore we (too) speak about it.” That is the contradiction: a ≠ a.
In a single sentence, SPIEGEL thus paces out the boundaries of Western logic:
“Contradiction is the outer limit of propositions, tautology their substanceless centre” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.143)
Language Creates Reality
But the situation is more complicated still: where medicine and climate science observe changes in a system that are independent of our language, the political system offers no such thing. For the political system consists of nothing but language. Politics acts through language. Laws are language. And elections, too, are linguistic utterances. Even the order to exercise the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force is issued in linguistic form. This is the great challenge in describing discourses in and about politics, society and culture: language does not simply say what is – it creates the reality it describes.
When the AfD candidate signs the SPIEGEL cover, he makes use of a cultural symbol and changes reality: an enlightening wanted poster becomes an autograph card, the criminal becomes a pop star. This is how language shapes reality. It does so explicitly, as John Austin set out in his speech act theory. But it also does so implicitly, whenever it merely claims to say what is – or accuses others of failing to do just that.
Every article, every comment shifts the frame of reference. Dirk Kurbjuweit writes: “We do not suffer from the hubris of believing that our journalism can influence election outcomes.” – That is not hubris. That is how public discourse works.




